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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
In light of the development of the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
(SWOCP) program in FY2000, the Surface Navy has devoted considerable resources to 
examining the causal factors that lead to a junior officer’s decision to remain in the 
Surface Fleet through the department head tours (Holloway, 2004).  In 1996 Mackin and 
Darling utilized an Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model to predict the 
effectiveness of implementing SWOCP.  Their model assumed that officers would remain 
in the Navy if their predicted current and future compensation in the Navy exceeded 
predicted compensation in the civilian sector.  They also compared the cost of paying 
varying bonus levels to increase retention versus the cost of training and paying higher 
numbers of initial accessions.  Their data showed that a $50,000 bonus was the optimal 
amount to achieve the desired department head school throughput of 275 officers per 
year.   
As expected, the implementation of SWOCP increased retention through the 
department head tours for Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) (Mackin, Darling, Hasan, & 
Crayton, 2002; “SWO Community,” 2005).  Although retention has improved, the SWO 
community is still struggling to reach its goal of 275 department head school graduates 
per year (“SWO Community,” 2005).  In response, the SWO community recently 
announced that SWOs would receive an additional $25,000 for committing to serve two 
department head tours (Harvey, 2006).  The SWO community managers have clearly 
placed an emphasis on using monetary incentives to increase retention.  A preliminary 
review of the extensive literature pertaining to employee turnover, however, yields two 
other broad categories of stay/leave determinants apart from human capital approaches: 
job satisfaction and personal characteristics (Applebaum, Wunderlich, Greenstone, 
Grenier, Shapiro, Leroux, & Troeger, 2003; Barak, Nissly, & Levin, 2001; Clifton, 2003; 
Duffy, 2000; Jackofsky, 1984; Lok & Crawford, 1999; Lucas, 1999; McEvoy & Cascio, 
1987; Miller & Wheeler, 1992; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, & Graske, 2001; Nolan, 1993; 
Ribelin, 2003; Sheridan, 1992; Wilcove, Schwerin, & Wolosin, 2003).     
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Previous research has yielded fairly consistent results with respect to the influence 
of personal (both demographic and background) characteristics on the retention decision.  
Accordingly, a solid understanding in the literature exists as to how an officer’s race, 
gender, commissioning source, marital status, and other personal characteristics influence 
his or her stay/leave decision (Bernard, 2002; Duffy, 2000; Gjurich,1999; Nolan, 1993).  
With the exception of marital and dependent status, the impact of these variables is 
approximately equal when seen in men and women.  Female officers tend to place a great 
emphasis, however, on the family commitment variable (Clifton, 2003).  In short, much is 
known about the influence personal characteristics and increased pay has on retention.  
The same knowledge does not exist, however, with regards to one of the most significant 
variables in the retention decision: job satisfaction. 
Many factors influence the construct that is job satisfaction.  Such factors include 
organizational culture, relationships with supervisors, working environment, and 
relationships with peers and/or subordinates.  The literature suggests that these job-
related aspects all work together to influence an employee’s job satisfaction and, by 
extension, his or her organizational commitment (Applebaum et al., 2003; Barak et al., 
2001; Jacofsky, 1984; Lok & Crawford, 1999; Lucas, 1999; Mitchel, 1981; Ribelin, 
2003; Satava, 2003; Sheridan, 1992).  During a SWO junior officer’s division officer 
tours, he or she will likely serve in two different ships and hold several different billets 
onboard those ships.  These ships may or may not be in the same homeport.  To this 
point, researchers have not devoted a study to exclusively determining how these 
assignment policies influence the stay/leave decision.  It is likely that different aspects of 
assignment policies exert varying levels of influence on junior officers.  Furthermore, this 
is the only aspect of satisfaction that the Navy directly controls.   This study will quantify 
any trends in differing officer retention levels amongst certain ship-types, homeports, and 
onboard billets.  The results of the proposed study will then allow Navy policymakers to 
better understand how assignment policy influences the stay/leave decision for junior 
SWOs. 
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis will examine Year Groups (YG) 1993-1997 and the relationship 
between Fleet experiences and retention for these Surface Warfare Officers.  These Year 
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Groups provide the most up-to-date data, which becomes significant since the 
composition of the Surface Fleet is always changing.  For example, studying the effect of 
ship type twenty years ago is not as useful since the Fleet looked very different then than 
it does now.  Additionally, YG 94 was the first group of officers to see SWOCP as an 
option prior to their retention decision point.  YG 93 will be used as a control group that 
did not see SWOCP as an option prior to its retention decision.   
The aforementioned data do, however, limit the effectiveness of the analysis.  The 
study will assume that if an officer is still designated as a SWO at Years Commissioned 
Service (YCS) 8 then he or she has accepted SWOCP and has continued in the Surface 
Navy.  The only certain way to ascertain continuation, however, is to follow the officer to 
the Lieutenant Commander selection board.  Utilizing this method does not allow the 
most up-to-date data to be included in the study.  Additionally, the exact nature of what 
makes certain ship-types, homeports and billets more likely to generate higher retention 
will remain unknown.  Hopefully, however, the results of this study will present enough 
background to conduct qualitative research in a future study to more precisely pinpoint 
causal factors.  Finally, the retention model in this study will purposely exclude many 
significant predictors to isolate the effects of ship type, homeport, and billet.  The 
resulting model then will be incomplete and must be seen as predicting only one aspect of 
the retention decision. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This study will utilize BUPERS data to conduct multiple regression analysis to 
determine the impact of assignment policy variables (ship type, homeport, and billet) on 
the retention decision of SWO junior officers.  In doing so, the analysis will control for 
personal (background and demographic) characteristics that the literature has found to 
significantly influence the retention decision.  These control variables include gender, 
ethnicity, marital status, commissioning source, prior enlisted status, and undergraduate 
major.  Since the dependent variable (stay/leave) is dichotomous, the study will use non-
linear logistic regression modeling techniques.       
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The wide array of literature pertaining to employee turnover simultaneously 
assists and restricts any researcher on this important topic.  The breadth of information 
provides many theoretical models to consider, but it also makes it difficult to establish 
consensus as to the direction, weight, and significance of independent variables in their 
causal relationships with turnover.  Despite this dilemma, this literature review will 
attempt to establish a theoretical underpinning for the data analysis in the following 
chapters.  The present review will discuss the “basics” of retention modeling and will 
then proceed to analyze relevant job satisfaction and human capital theory research.  The 
review will conclude with an in-depth discussion of past SWO retention studies.      
A. INTRODUCTION TO RETENTION MODELING 
To maximize the effectiveness of any retention analysis, the researcher must first 
determine which independent variables to include in the model as control variables.  
Inaccurate inclusion or exclusion of variables can either exaggerate or diminish the actual 
effects of the independent variables of interest.  Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, and Graske 
(2001) found that even the most complex retention models failed to explain as much as 
75 percent of the variance in the stay/leave decision.  They proposed that a wide variety 
of “shocks” often initiate the turnover process.  These shocks include, but are not limited 
to, mergers, unsolicited job offers, friends’ leaving, spouse relocations, and poor 
performance appraisal.  Clearly, this theory complicates the establishment of any 
retention model in that there is no way to fully account for the seemingly infinite number 
of events that Mitchell et al. would define as “shocks.”  They do, however, definitively 
conclude that “[r]etention cannot be accomplished purely through money.  A host of on-
the-job and off-the-job factors must be considered when developing a retention plan.” 
(Mitchell et al., p. 104)  In other words, while retention modeling is complicated, the 
researcher must avoid any tendency to explain away retention and turnover solely in 
monetary terms. 
While Mitchel et al. (2001) certainly emphasize the importance of “shocks” in the 
initiation of a turnover process, they also argue that job dissatisfaction is the most 
frequent cause of turnover.  A singular event might cause such dissatisfaction, but 
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turnover can also result from a steady “build-up” of dissatisfying job conditions.  
Accordingly, some employees have the time to develop a follow-on plan while others do 
not.  Mitchel et al. therefore offer four paths that individuals might take when they leave 
a job: following a plan, leaving without a plan, leaving for something better, and leaving 
an unsatisfying job.  Conversely, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, few 
alternatives, and “job embeddedness” reduce job turnover.  Mitchel et al. use the term 
“job embeddedness” to refer to the tendency of work-life effects to influence the 
retention decision.  For example, an employee might be more likely to stay in an 
organization because he or she enjoys playing on the company softball team and is 
pleased with the local school system.  Mitchel et al. (p. 103) also emphasize the 
importance of fit—“an employee’s perceived compatibility with job, organization, and 
community.”  In other words an employee’s likelihood to remain at a certain job is not as 
simple as measuring one’s current salary against an expected future salary.  Instead, the 
interaction between an employee’s personal priorities and goals and the organization’s 
priorities and goals exerts stronger influence on the retention decision than more 
measurable determinants.              
While Mitchell et al. (2001) provide a warning worthy of consideration with 
respect to oversimplifying the model, the literature should provide enough guidance to 
help determine a baseline retention model. The literature groups stay/leave determinants 
into three broad categories: job satisfaction, human capital, and personal characteristics.  
This literature review will focus on research from the civilian sector to explore the effects 
of job satisfaction.  Discussion of human capital and personal characteristics effects will 
largely rely on previous SWO retention studies.  Upon completion of the literature 
review, this analysis will present a hypothesized retention model that will include both 
background variables and variables that capture elements of the aforementioned fit 
construct and job satisfaction.  Since job satisfaction is by no means a dichotomous 
variable, a thorough discussion of its many elements follows.    
B. JOB SATISFACTION 
Having established in the previous section that non-monetary factors do play a 
significant role in the stay/leave decision, this review will now examine several elements 
within the “job satisfaction” construct.  To begin, it will define job satisfaction and 
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present several studies that show the strong correlation between high job satisfaction and 
retention.  One study will also draw important distinctions between the influence of job 
satisfaction in the civilian sector and in the military.  This section will then explicitly 
highlight the importance of two “sub-elements” of job satisfaction: job performance and 
leadership.  While these constructs certainly influence an employee’s job satisfaction, 
they possess unique characteristics that make them worthy of consideration in their own 
right.  As the literature will demonstrate, job satisfaction, job performance, and leadership 
strongly relate to retention and therefore must not be ignored in any analysis of SWO 
retention.  These determinants, however, are difficult to measure.  The present study 
hopes to approximate differences in job satisfaction levels among junior SWOs by 
analyzing potential retention differences that correlate to initial homeports, ship types, 
and billets.       
Applebaum et al. (2003, p. 273) define job satisfaction as “a general attitude 
toward one’s job; the difference between the amount of rewards workers actually receive 
and the amount they believe they should receive.”  On the surface such a definition may 
seem to imply that financial compensation is the only barometer of an employee’s 
likelihood to experience high levels of job satisfaction.  It is important to remember, 
however, that employers also use non-monetary rewards to motivate their employees.  
Since the literature has consistently pointed to job satisfaction as a critical factor in the 
stay/leave decision, it would be negligent to brush past the many lessons to be learned 
from the examination of job satisfaction studies (Applebaum et al.; Barak, Nissly, & 
Levin, 2001; Hay, 2002; Jackofsky, 1984; Lok & Crawford, 1999; Lucas, 1999; Mitchel, 
1981; Ribelin, 2003; Satava, 2003; Sheridan, 1992).  In their meta-analysis of articles 
pertaining to turnover in social service fields between 1980 and 2000, Barak et al. found 
that “work-related” factors predict turnover better than individual factors.  They conclude 
that the most important contributors to turnover in human services fields are stress, 
burnout, and lack of job satisfaction.  Although imperfect, comparisons between human 
services employees and naval officers make sense since both professions involve long 
work hours and potentially stressful situations.  Sanchez, Bray, Vincus, and Bann (2004) 
utilized job satisfaction data from both active duty and reserve military members and 
found that high job pressure and supervisor-induced stress were the biggest predictors of 
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lower levels of job satisfaction.  These results complement Barak et al.’s findings as both 
emphasize the strong relationship between work factors and job satisfaction.  Sanchez et 
al. did, however, acknowledge the presence of higher job satisfaction levels in more 
senior (and thus older) military members.  This conclusion indicates that personal 
characteristics must not be completely ignored in the development of the present 
retention model.   
Results from a 1999 Quality of Life (QOL) survey of Navy enlisted personnel 
also seem to indicate that personal factors must not be ignored (Wilcove, Schwerin, & 
Wolosin, 2003).  In fact the study concludes that personal factors better predict 
reenlistment intent than do work factors.  While this may seem to contradict previously 
cited studies, a subtle, but critical, argument explains how such results can co-exist with 
the aforementioned civilian sector research (Applebaum et al., 2003; Barak et al., 2001; 
Hay, 2002; Jackofsky, 1984; Lok & Crawford, 1999; Lucas, 1999; Mitchel, 1981; 
Ribelin, 2003; Satava, 2003; Sheridan, 1992).  Wilcove et al. postulate that the relatively 
short length of tours in the Navy may allow Sailors to remain committed to a naval career 
in the face of dissatisfying jobs.  This ability to separate one’s current satisfaction from 
long-term commitment is a potentially unique aspect of military service.  From a 
retention standpoint, satisfaction with the prospect of future service is the most important 
element of job satisfaction. The 1999 QOL survey, however, only explains the presence 
of satisfaction in the current work environment—not throughout a future career.        
1. Job Performance 
Within the job satisfaction literature, job performance and quality of leadership 
stand as the two most significant contributors to an employee’s job satisfaction.  In 1987 
McEvoy and Cascio conducted a meta-analysis of 24 studies that examined the 
relationship between job performance and employee turnover.  Although much of the 
evidence was inconclusive, they found that the overall relationship was negative.  In 
other words, higher performance often leads to higher satisfaction, which in turns helps to 
reduce turnover.  They found that job performance generally predicts turnover at a level 
comparable to organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and behavioral intentions. 
McEvoy and Cascio therefore recommend that job performance should be kept as an 
independent variable in future turnover studies to improve the predictive power of the 
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modeling. Since SWO qualification is the only available performance-related variable, 
however, the limited amount of performance data will mitigate the effectiveness of the 
proposed retention model.   
One element that broaches the overlap between job performance and leadership 
quality is the intangible notion of job fulfillment as it relates to performance, satisfaction, 
and turnover.  Lucas (1999) conducted a controlled experiment with college students in 
an attempt to determine if higher-status titles influence performance and satisfaction.  He 
found that being designated as a leader increases satisfaction, commitment, performance, 
and reduces turnover intention.  Although Lucas purposely did not account for 
relationships between these dependent variables, his research remains both viable and 
valuable to this study as it considers the influence of billet on retention.  He cautions 
though that higher status titles for one worker may reduce effectiveness of his or her co-
workers and that “empty” titles could lead to cynicism and potentially eliminate any 
gains wrought from the initial status increase.  Although retention data on recently-
commissioned YGs is not yet available, this notion of shallow responsibility leading to 
dissatisfaction echoes the concerns of some within the SWO community who fear that 
recent manning surpluses have potentially harmed long-term retention behavior.  As 
such, future researchers would be wise to revisit this discussion in the coming years as 
the overmanned cohorts move past their MSRs.     
Miller and Wheeler (1992) found that the aforementioned importance of job 
fulfillment shows stronger effects in women than in men.  In 956 questionnaires they 
asked executives, managers, and professionals in a large city government, a university, 
and a large publicly held corporation to evaluate the level of different aspects of job 
satisfaction.  Women were twice as likely to report they intended to leave the 
organization within two years.  Gender alone, however, only accounted for two percent of 
the variance.  When Miller and Wheeler altered their analysis to control for job 
satisfaction, these gender differences disappeared.  In particular, the “meaningful work” 
component of job satisfaction was considerably more influential on women than on men.  
The literature, then, points to the importance of fulfillment to performance and 
satisfaction.  Accordingly, the proposed retention model will include fleet experience 
variables (initial homeport, initial ship type, initial shipboard department) that should 
10 
partially account for differing degrees of fulfillment as displayed by differences in 
retention behavior.  An absolutely critical influencer of all of these elements is the most 
important individual in the battle for corporate talent: the frontline supervisor. 
2. Quality of Leadership 
Perhaps the single most consistent strand of argument within the job satisfaction 
and retention literature is that leadership matters.  In her article discussing nurse 
management and retention at hospitals, Ribelin (2003, p. 18) comments that “[n]urses 
don’t leave hospitals, they leave managers.”  Those nurses who maintain positive 
relationships with their immediate managers are more likely to demonstrate higher levels 
of organizational commitment.  Managers who think and talk positively about the 
organization frequently are influential in their subordinates’ decision to remain at the 
hospital.  Even more importantly, Ribelin emphasizes that the immediate supervisor’s 
opinion about a subordinate is more important than overall company policies.   
In their 1999 study of nurses at seven large Sydney, Australia hospitals, Lok and 
Crawford examined the relationship between culture, commitment, leadership style, and 
job satisfaction.  They utilized several different elements of job satisfaction to determine 
which needs influenced nurses more strongly in their opinions of their supervisors.  They 
found that higher-order needs (level of control, amount of interaction, level of 
professionalism) exerted the greatest influence on commitment and job satisfaction.  In 
other words, nurses whose supervisors remained attentive to these higher-order needs 
were more likely to exhibit higher degrees of organizational commitment and job 
satisfaction.  Additionally, the nurses’ responses indicated that subcultures within their 
wards were more influential on their organizational commitment than an overall notion of 
hospital culture.  Innovative and supportive subcultures had the most significant and 
positive impact on these feelings of commitment.   
 Lok and Crawford (1999) also studied the effects of different leadership styles on 
organizational commitment and job satisfaction.  They utilized two broad categories of 
leadership styles: consideration and initiating structure.  The consideration style 
emphasizes interpersonal relationships while the structure style emphasizes procedure 
and exactness in following protocols.  Not surprisingly, the consideration leadership style 
more strongly influenced organizational commitment than did the structure leadership 
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style.  One prerequisite of Lok and Crawford’s study was that only those nurses whose 
manager had been on the job for over a year were included in the study.  The researchers 
imposed this limitation in an attempt to ensure that the leadership styles and cultures 
being examined were somewhat stable and well-understood by the survey’s respondents.  
Although this limitation influences the degree to which Lok and Crawford’s findings may 
be translated to discussions about supervisor influence within the Surface Navy, their 
study is not the only one to determine that “people-first” managers increase 
organizational commitment and job satisfaction.  Sheridan (1992) studied six 
international accounting firms and concluded that young professionals hired by firms 
emphasizing interpersonal relationships (team orientation and respect for people) stayed 
14 months longer than those young professionals hired by firms emphasizing work task 
values.  Additionally, Satava (2003, p. 68), who also studied accounting firms, found that 
“[a] corporate culture that emphasizes teamwork and civility over rigid quotas and 
systems will hang on to its employees (and its training investment) longer . . .”  Clearly, 
leadership—and its strong influence on job satisfaction, commitment, and culture—
matters. 
 Hay (2002) argues that pay is not the major factor that leads to dissatisfaction 
amongst employees.  Instead, his survey of employees working for 330 companies in 50 
countries in six different fields (information technology, sales, hourly, clerical, 
professionals, and managements) indicates that employees who leave their jobs are 
typically more dissatisfied with how their talents are being used and the lack of attention 
managers give to career development.  With few exceptions, the reviewed literature 
concurs with the importance of non-monetary factors in the retention decision 
(Applebaum et al., 2003; Barak et al., 2001; Jackofsky, 1984; Lok & Crawford, 1999; 
Lucas, 1999; Mitchel, 1981; Ribelin, 2003; Satava, 2003; Sheridan, 1992).  Ignoring the 
influence of job satisfaction and particularly the importance of job performance and 
leadership, on the stay/leave decision can quickly lead an organization into dangerous 
waters. 
While this point may seem rather elementary, it cannot be overstated.  In the 
context of the present study, a difference in retention associated with fleet experience 
variables might indicate that leadership differs between ship types, departments, or 
12 
perhaps even homeports.  In other words, differing retention patterns between the fleet 
experience variables could indicate that certain types of leaders (more positive or more 
negatives ones depending on the direction of influence) might gravitate towards certain 
jobs on certain ships in certain homeports.  Differences in retention between officers who 
have served in certain departments onboard ship might indicate that the associated 
department heads are more likely to express positive (or negative) views about remaining 
in the Surface Navy.  By way of example, many SWOs might argue that serving in the 
engineering department is the most difficult assignment onboard ship.  The constant 
attention required to successfully maintain any ship’s engineering plant can often lead to 
a stressful work life for those charged with its care.  Therefore the ship’s engineer might 
be more likely to exhibit behaviors that would dissuade his or her division officers from 
following in his or her footsteps as a department head.  
The inclusion of ship type, homeport, and billet is intended to partially capture the 
retention effect of higher (or lower) job satisfaction levels.  In other words, are leadership 
styles conducive to retention more likely present in certain types of ships or does the 
quality of life in certain homeports lead to increased job satisfaction and therefore 
improved retention levels?  These are just a few of the questions that the present study 
hopes to explore by analyzing the effects of fleet experience variables on retention.  
While this study will not be able to precisely pinpoint satisfaction levels or leadership 
effects, it does have the potential to provide background for further qualitative research 
into often overlooked SWO retention determinants.   
C. HUMAN CAPITAL FACTORS 
The majority of retention initiatives undertaken by the SWO community 
managers have centered on economic incentives.  The most significant of these is clearly 
Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP)—a $50,000 bonus given to SWO 
junior officers who commit to completing two 18-month afloat department head tours.  
Recently, this figure increased to $75,000 with the creation of a Junior SWO Critical 
Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB).  Officers are eligible to receive a percentage of the 
Junior CSRB at YCS 6 and YCS 7.  In light of increasing bonus figures, any SWO 
retention study would be incomplete without a discussion of the human capital theory  
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that is the impetus behind retention incentive pay.  Since the present study will examine 
data from YGs 93-97, the creation of SWOCP in FY 2000 might partially explain any 
increases in retention rates between YGs.    
Barak et al. (2001, p. 627) explain that “[h]uman capital lies within a person.  
Hence, it is not easily transferable; it can be gained only by investing in a person over a 
long period of time.”  Such a notion is especially true in the Surface Navy’s “close-
ended” personnel system since all personnel within it must be “grown” (Mackin & 
Darling, 1996).  Unlike many other organizations the SWO community managers cannot 
deploy officers to a job fair and hire a crop of new department heads.  Instead, the 
personnel system must have enough flexibility to respond to varying turnover rates so 
that the community consistently meets its required manning objectives.  In determining 
expected retention rates, analysts utilize the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) method 
that compares expected military compensation over a given time period with expected 
civilian sector compensation over the same period.  Once factors that account for “taste” 
are included, the analyst will predict that an officer will remain in the Navy if his or her 
military figure exceeds his or her civilian figure.  In 1996 Mackin and Darling conducted 
a study using this methodology to determine projected retention rates for the proposed 
SWOCP that was then in development.     
1. SWOCP Study (1996) 
Initial justification for SWOCP was threefold: to increase retention and therefore 
reduce overall cost by eliminating unnecessary accessions and associated training costs, 
to alleviate current shortfalls within certain SWO year groups, and to improve the 
community’s ability to attract quality new accessions (Mackin & Darling, 1996).  Mackin 
& Darling analyzed the projected viability of SWOCP by calculating whether cost 
savings from reduced accessions would offset the costs of the bonuses themselves.  They 
modeled projected retention behavior using pay elasticities from the Naval Aviation and 
Nuclear Power communities.  They estimated projected savings using the Navy’s Billet 
Cost Factor analysis that stipulate the taxpayer cost per accession.  To ensure 
conservative estimation, they assumed that USNA accessions would remain constant and 
that reductions would come from the ROTC and OCS programs.  Additionally, they 
assumed that post-commissioning training costs would remain fixed.  Based on the above 
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assumptions and a cohort that included only conventional SWOs (since Mackin and 
Darling assumed that nuclear option SWOs would opt for the higher nuclear power 
bonuses), the ACOL modeling suggested that the Navy should pay SWOs between YCS 
5 and YCS 8 an additional $10,000 per year for service beyond Minimum Service 
Requirement (MSR).  The suggested payments would cease at YCS 10.  As previously 
mentioned, the Navy instituted a $50,000 SWOCP in FY 2000 that looked very much like 
Mackin and Darling’s suggested form. 
2. SWOCP Study (2002) 
Six years after the initial study, Mackin, Darling, Hasan, and Crayton (2002) 
designed a basic econometric model of SWO retention behavior.  As in the earlier study, 
they utilized ACOL modeling but readily admitted that no analysis could ever pinpoint 
all factors involved in the stay/leave decision. They also acknowledged that an unusually 
strong labor market and a relatively higher demand for more senior SWOs than junior 
SWOs exacerbated their analysis.  In an improvement over the 1996 analysis they 
included many variables in addition to the ACOL variable: unemployment rate, 
commissioning source, prior enlisted status, gender, race (white/non-white), dependents 
(yes/no), initial ship type assignment, and department head tour length.  They analyzed 
1979-2000 data pertaining to conventional SWOs, conducting the ACOL analysis at 
seven career decisions points—the first being at YCS 5.   
As expected, increased pay positively correlated with retention at each decision 
point.  Higher unemployment rates also improved retention statistics.  At the first 
decision point, the data indicated that the following variables demonstrated a strong, 
positive correlation with retention: female, OCS, and prior enlisted status.  USNA 
graduates were more likely to retain than ROTC graduates but were less likely to retain 
than OCS graduates.  Having dependents showed a weak, but positive, correlation with 
retention.  Additionally, non-white officers were less likely to remain in the Surface Navy 
than white officers.  Initial ship assignment did not relate significantly to retention, while 
longer department head tours reduced an officer’s likelihood of retaining. 
Although Mackin et al. do not directly address the issue, the result that female 
officers are nearly 10% more likely to retain than male officers is indeed surprising since 
such a finding is inconsistent with the SWO retention studies cited in the forthcoming 
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section.  It should be noted, however, that their officer cohort was slightly less than 3% 
female.  Additionally, only the last few year groups in the study served the majority of 
their careers after the repeal of the combat exclusion law in 1993.  Combining this factor 
with the already-low percentage of women in the study, the cause of higher retention in 
females is likely a case of self-selection.  In other words, a woman’s career path greatly 
differed from a male’s career path prior to 1993.  Until the repeal of the combat exclusion 
law, women could only serve in support (non-combatant) ships such as fleet oilers or 
supply ships.  While URL commissioning requirements compelled many men to serve in 
surface combatants, women served onboard ship by their own volition.  Since policy did 
not “force” them into an afloat community, those who volunteered self-selected the more 
rigorous lifestyle associated with a career laden with extensive sea duty.   
Mackin et al. (2002) do, however, address the insignificant impact of initial ship 
assignment on retention.  They postulate that the inconclusive findings might be the 
partial result of inappropriate ship-type groupings or errors in Unit Identification Code 
errors.  They group the ship classes as follows: auxiliary, big amphibious ships, small 
amphibious ships, guided-missile destroyers/cruisers, destroyers/frigates, carriers, 
minesweepers, afloat staff, and other assignments.  Furthermore, they did not include 
USNA and ROTC officers in this part of the study since ship assignments are not random 
for these officers.  After examining both the monetary and non-monetary factors included 
in their model, Mackin et al. concluded that SWOCP had increased retention at MSR by 
over 15%.  They are quick to admit, however, that since the Navy instituted SWOCP in 
the last year of their data set further research is required to understand the long-term 
effect of the bonuses.  Amongst other factors, they also recommend that further research 
should include geographic location in SWO retention studies.  Accordingly, the present 
study will include an independent variable that accounts for any influence geographic 
location might have on retention.  
D. PREVIOUS SWO RETENTION STUDIES 
  Before concluding this literature review and proceeding with the present 
analysis, it is instructive to examine several other statistical studies that explored SWO 
retention determinants.  As mentioned in the previous section, Mackin et al. (2002) 
concluded that the following characteristics have a significant and positive impact on 
16 
retention: white, female, OCS graduate, prior enlisted, and dependents.  Of these 
findings, it should be noted that the direction of gender influence is erroneous.  Women 
only retain in the Surface Navy at approximately half the rate men do. (“SWO 
Community” brief, 2006). The other findings, however, are consistent with similar 
studies although overall trends are somewhat inconclusive.  This section will examine 
several previous studies to help establish SWO retention trends.  Once the review 
identifies significant determinants, the analysis will continue with a hypothesized SWO 
retention model. 
1. Bautista (1996) 
Bautista utilized longitudinal data from YGs 1976-1990 to examine retention 
trends in   three different career phases: termer, doubter, and career.  “Termers” are those 
officers who have not yet reached their MSR.  “Doubters” are those who have reached 
MSR but have yet to “appear” before the LCDR Promotion Board.  “Careerists” are those 
officers who have passed the LCDR Board milestone.  Bautista defined separators as 
those officers who left the Navy prior to the LCDR Board (YCS 9).  While the influence 
of ship type on retention was the focus of his study, Bautista did examine the influence of 
personal background characteristics.  For termers the following characteristics positively 
related with retention: age, black, graduate education, low college GPA, and OCS 
graduate.  Most relationships remained constant into the doubter phase, but USNA and 
NROTC graduates became less likely to separate than OCS graduates.  With respect to 
accession source, Bautista concluded that while USNA and NROTC graduates are more 
likely to separate at MSR, they have a higher chance of continuing for a career if they do 
decide to stay in the Navy at their first decision point.  Bautista also found that junior 
officers who received RAPs (Recommendation for Accelerated Promotion) were more 
likely to remain in the Navy past MSR.  In other words, job performance positively 
correlates with retention. 
Bautista’s logit analysis did not reveal any significant relationships between ship 
type and retention during any of the three career phases.  He does, however, argue that 
since CRUDES assignment is conducive to timely SWO qualification those officers who 
have served in CRUDES ships may be more likely to remain in the Navy by virtue of 
higher performance appraisals spurred by timely qualification.  Both black and white 
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officers initially assigned to aircraft carriers exhibit lower retention rates than officers 
initially assigned to other types of ships.  As mentioned above, though, this trend does not 
remain evident when the logit analysis includes other variables.  Bautista concludes his 
analysis by remarking that while certain trends do seem to be important, the 
interrelationships among all of the variables exert stronger forces than does any single 
factor. 
2. Johnson (1998) 
Johnson analyzed the effect of both pre-commissioning and post-commissioning 
variables on the retention decision using Officer Promotion History Files data on YGs 
1976-1986.  He included demographics, education background (major and GPA), and 
commissioning source in his pre-commissioning grouping.  His post-commissioning 
variables included performance, ship assignment, retention, and promotion.  Johnson 
used timeliness of SWO qualification and fitness report scores as performance proxies.  
The SWO qualification variables captured years to qualification and whether or not an 
officer attained qualification within two years of commissioning.  He defined ship 
assignment as a binomial variable that identified those who had CRUDES experience 
(CG/DD/DDG/FFG) in their division officer tours.  Of note, 75% of officers in the data 
files had CRUDES experience.  Service through the LCDR board determined retention, 
and selection to LCDR at the board determined promotion.  During his analysis, Johnson 
used the post-commissioning variables as both independent and dependent variables.   
Johnson’s study provides several observations to guide the present analysis.  Most 
significantly, he found that post-commissioning variables have the strongest influence on 
promotion to LCDR.  Specifically, CRUDES experience was a strong predictor of both 
retention and promotion.  The data also showed a positive correlation between GPA and 
CRUDES assignment—a conclusion that supports anecdotal evidence from this author 
who has observed that cruisers and destroyers are generally more “popular” with 
midshipmen who have the opportunity to pick their initial ship assignments.  Johnson 
also concluded that being a USNA graduate and an undergraduate non-engineering major 




observing that the first step towards a successful SWO career is CRUDES assignment 
during the division officer tours since such assignment predicts early qualification, 
retention, and promotion. 
3. Duffy (2000) 
Like Bautista and Johnson, Duffy studied the impact of both pre-commissioning 
and post-commissioning variables on the retention decision within the Surface Warfare 
community.  He used data from the Navy Officer Master File and the Navy Officer Loss 
File to study the behavior of YGs 1977-1985.  Amongst these year groups, Duffy 
excluded Surface Nuclear officers because of differing retention patterns.  He also 
excluded women since they were restricted to the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) branch 
of the SWO community during the relevant time period.  Duffy grouped his cohort into 
three groups: STAYSWO (SWOs promoted to LCDR), STAYNAV (officers promoted to 
LCDR but no longer designated as a SWO), and LEAVERS (officers who began as a 
SWO but no longer remain in the Navy).  He defined the following variables as baseline 
retention factors: undergraduate major, age at commissioning, number of dependents at 
LT board, undergraduate GPA, commissioning source, and ethnic background.  Fleet 
experience variables include initial ship type assignment, initial department assignment, 
percent of O-1 and O-2 fitness reports with a RAP, number of billets held as a junior 
officer, whether or not an officer served in more than one ship as a division officer, and 
whether or not the officer began his career in the SWO community.  Unlike Johnson, 
Duffy included multiple categories in this ship type variable: carrier, cruiser, destroyer, 
frigate, battleship, big amphibious ships, CLF ships, minesweepers, and small 
amphibious ships.  
Duffy excluded the STAYNAV grouping when he conducted a logistic regression 
to determine factors that predict inclusion in the STAYSWO grouping.  He found that 
adding the fleet experience factors improved the predictive power of the baseline model.  
These variables positively related to retention: age, married with children, divorced with 
children, service in a cruiser or destroyer (relative to service in a frigate), RAPs, number 
of junior officer billets, and service in multiple ships.  Negatively related variables 
include engineering and business majors (relative to pure science majors), undergraduate 
GPA, and OCS graduates (relative to USNA graduates).  Duffy hypothesized that the 
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lower retention rates of those with engineering and business majors and those with higher 
GPAs might be the result of higher civilian earnings potential.  With respect to 
commissioning source, Duffy reasoned that USNA and ROTC graduates might have a 
better initial understanding of the SWO lifestyle and therefore were less likely to suffer 
negative shock effects than were OCS graduates. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This literature review attempted to determine the influence of work factors, non-
work factors, monetary factors, and non-monetary factors on the retention decision.  
Based on research from the civilian sector, non-monetary work factors most strongly 
influence an employee’s likelihood to remain at his or her current job.  Most significant 
amongst these determinants are job satisfaction, job performance, and leadership quality.  
Higher job performance and effective, positive leadership usually increase an employee’s 
job satisfaction and therefore his or her intention to remain at an organization.  Previous 
SWO retention studies demonstrate the significant influence of several demographic and 
background characteristics: gender, ethnic background, commissioning source, 
undergraduate major, age, dependent status, and prior-enlisted status.  Because of their 
consistent significance in retention analysis, these variables will comprise the present 
study’s baseline retention model.  To address the problem of multicollinearity in the 
analysis, care will be taken to specify uncorrelated independent variables in all regression 
model specifications.  
Previous studies also indicate a general trend that CRUDES experience increases 
the chances that an officer will remain in the Surface Navy.  To ensure that the present 
study does not omit potentially significant effects of CRUDES experience, the analysis 
will lend special consideration to CRUDES experience in an officer’s background.  
Given the importance placed on non-monetary factors in the civilian research this study 
will now proceed by examining the effects of Navy experience variables—ship-type, 
homeport, and billet—on the retention decision.  Although precise measurement is 
impossible, each of these variables can potentially influence a junior officer’s job 
satisfaction.  In the case of ship-type and billet, different classes and departments might 
attract varying leadership styles that could influence division officers’ retention 
decisions.  Ships also operate in different environments and under a myriad of 
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circumstances based on the type of ship and its homeport.  If retention levels then vary 
between these classes and ports, one can reasonably conclude that there is something 
about service in said platforms and locations that is more (or less) satisfying.  These 
scenarios are just a few that indicate the potential importance of fleet experience 
variables in the retention decision.  The next chapter will more thoroughly discuss these 
variables and their expected impact on the stay/leave decision.         
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter established a theoretical foundation to guide the present 
analysis by exploring the civilian literature pertaining to employee turnover.  Job 
satisfaction, job performance, and leadership effectiveness clearly play an important role 
in an employee’s stay/leave decision.  Previous SWO retention research, however, 
cautions the analyst to not ignore critical background and demographic characteristics.  
This chapter will present a retention model that accounts for both job satisfaction and 
background influences.       
A. DATA 
This study utilized Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) data from the Officer 
History Promotion Files and the Navy Master Loss File.  Additionally, the study merged 
the BUPERS data with demographic and background information from the Center for 
Naval Analysis (CNA) to ultimately yield 3,206 cases for Surface Warfare Officers in 
YGs 93-97.  The merged, final data set included 461 variables—some of which resulted 
from the recoding of variables in the initial data set.       
B. METHODOLOGY 
The dichotomous nature of the dependent variables necessitated the use of non-
linear logistic regression analysis to ascertain the influence of the control and 
independent variables.  Once the literature review established which control variables 
should be included in the retention model, the author conducted multiple regressions to 
determine which independent variables to include in the final retention model.  The 
following sections will describe the characteristics and expected influence of both the 
control and independent variables in the retention model.  After conducting the final 
regression analysis, the author calculated the marginal effects (Fx) of each variable using 
the following equation: 
)1( ppFx −×= β , where: 








The next chapter will utilize the marginal effects information to describe the extent of the 
influence of the significant variables in the final regressions. 
C. VARIABLES IN THE RETENTION MODEL 
The literature review proposed that any SWO retention analysis should include 
the following demographic and background variables: gender, ethnic background, 
commissioning source, undergraduate major, age, dependent status, and prior-enlisted 
status.  Since the age at commissioning variable and the prior enlisted variable are highly 
correlated, the model will only include the prior enlisted variable.  The model will also 
include a Year Group variable to control for expected SWOCP effects, varying economic 
conditions, and the surge in retention generally associated with the 9/11 attacks.  In order 
to explore the potential effects of differing job satisfaction levels on retention and to 
examine the Navy’s assignment policies, the retention model includes these independent 
variables: initial homeport, CRUDES experience, and initial department.  Table 1 
outlines the variables in the proposed retention model: 
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Table 1.  Categorical Percentages of Variables in the Retention Model 
Control Variables   Independent Variables 
Gender   Initial Homeport   
Male 89.5  MIDLANT 33.3 
Female 10.5  PACNW 7.9 
Ethnicity   SOCAL 26.4 
White 76.3  SOUTH 17.3 
AfrAmer 9.3  HAWAII 6.5 
Hispanic 7.8  OVERSEAS 8.6 
Other 6.7  Crudes Experience   
Dependent Status   Only 49.9 
SingleNoKids 50.0  MoveOut 14.8 
MarNoKids 29.1  MoveIn 9.0 
MarDivKids 21.0  Never 26.3 
Prior Enlisted   Initial Department   
Non-Prior  78.0  Engineering 39.8 
Prior Enlisted 22.0  Weapons 24.0 
Comm. Program   Operations 36.2 
USNA 40.1     
ROTC 40.1     
OCS-Other 19.7     
Undergrad Major      
Engineering 28.4     
PhySci&Math 15.8     
BioSci 4.6     
SocSci 20.4     
Bus-Econ 9.3     
Humanities 6.6     
Unknown 14.9     
Year Group      
YG93 20.1     
YG94 20.1     
YG95 22.2     
YG96 20.1     
YG97 17.4       
Each paragraph that follows will describe the frequencies, characteristics, and expected 
influence of each of the above variables.  This chapter will conclude with a figure that 
summarizes the expected influence of each variable in the proposed model in the 
retention decision.  
1. Gender 
The gender variable in the data set is dichotomous, where male=0 and female=1. 
Of the 3,206 officers in the data set, 337 (10.5%) are female.  Historical BUPERS data 
show that women retain at a significantly lower rate than men (“SWO Community” brief, 
2005).  Many women view the SWO lifestyle as mutually exclusive with starting a family 
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and therefore leave the community at a higher rate (Clifton, 2003).  Accordingly, the 
predicted influence of the gender variable is significant and negative. 
2. Ethnic Background 
The ethnic background variable is categorical.  Of the 3,206 officers in the data 
set, 2445 (76.3%) are white, 297 (9.3%) are African-American, 249 (7.8%) are Hispanic, 
and 215 (6.7%) are members of “other” ethnic groups.  These groups include, but are not 
limited to, Asian, Pacific Islander, and Native American.  Throughout this analysis, 
“white” is the reference ethnicity.  Previous SWO retention studies utilized YGs that are 
more senior than YGs 93-97 (Bautista, 1996; Duffy, 2000; Mackin et al., 2002).  In these 
studies, whites comprised a greater percentage of the total population than they do in the 
current study.  Bautista found that non-whites were more likely to remain in the Surface 
Navy while Mackin et al. found that whites were more likely to remain.  Duffy did not 
find a statistically significant relationship in his ethnicity variable. Unlike previous 
studies cited, this analysis differentiates Hispanics from other minority populations.  
Since minority officers might perceive greater advancement opportunities in the Navy 
than in the civilian sector, the predicted influence of being an ethnic minority is positive.  
This relationship may, however, be weak if it is significant. 
3. Commissioning Source 
The commissioning source variable is categorical.  Of the 3,206 officers in the 
data set, 1286 (40.1%) are USNA graduates, 1287 (40.1%) are ROTC graduates, and 633 
(19.7%) received their commissions via OCS or other officer accession programs.  
Throughout this analysis, USNA is the reference commissioning source.  As with the 
ethnicity variable, previous SWO retention studies are not consistent with respect to the 
effect of commissioning source on retention.  Bautista (1996) and Mackin et al. (2002) 
found that OCS graduates were more likely to remain in the Surface Navy than USNA 
and ROTC graduates, while Johnson (1998) and Duffy (2000) found that being a USNA 
graduate was conducive to retention in the Surface Navy.   
A significant difference between the officer cohorts examined in the present 
analysis and those examined in previous studies is that OCS graduates comprise a much 
smaller percentage of the total population in this study’s cohort.  The downsizing of the 
military in the 1990s accounts for this difference since the OCS program is the first one 
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to see reductions in its throughput when the Navy decides to reduce officer accessions.  
The differences in commissioning source proportions from previous studies make 
predicting the effect of commissioning source in the current analysis difficult.  One can 
argue that USNA graduates are more likely to remain in the Navy because they have a 
higher “taste” for the military lifestyle.  Otherwise, they would not have matriculated at 
the Naval Academy.  Since USNA graduates (with the exception of those disqualified 
medically) must enter the Unrestricted Line, they also, however, are probably more likely 
to laterally transfer to the Restricted Line and Staff Corps communities since those 
careers are not initially viable options.  On the other hand, OCS graduates might be more 
inclined to stay in the Surface Navy since they had the option to enter a Restricted Line 
or Staff Corps pipeline as ensigns.  Reductions in the number of OCS accessions also 
could have made the program more competitive.  Accordingly, those who successfully 
competed might have possessed a high “taste” factor for the military lifestyle.  Because 
of these factors, being an OCS graduate will most likely make an officer more likely to 
remain in the Surface Navy in the present analysis.  Naval Academy graduates also 
should be more likely to laterally transfer from the Surface Navy since the Restricted 
Line and Staff Corps communities are generally not options at commissioning.  Those 
officers who are ROTC graduates will likely fall somewhere between OCS and USNA 
graduates with respect to their behavior patterns.  While certainly an imperfect 
generalization, this prediction rests on the notion that the nature of the ROTC experience 
lies somewhere in between the OCS and USNA experience—thus making ROTC 
graduates likely to behave moderately when compared to peers from the other two 
commissioning sources.   
4. Undergraduate Major 
The undergraduate major variable is categorical.  Of the 3,206 officers in the 
present analysis, 909 (28.4%) majored in engineering, 506 (15.8%) majored in the 
physical sciences or mathematics, 149 (4.6%) majored in the biological sciences, 653 
(20.4%) majored in the social sciences, 299 (9.3%) majored in business or economics, 
212 (6.6%) majored in the humanities, and 478 (14.9%) do not have undergraduate major 
information in their pre-commissioning records.  Throughout the analysis, engineering is 
the reference category.  Since this analysis includes pre-commissioning variables only as 
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control variables, all data analysis will include those records with unknown 
undergraduate majors.  Preliminary data analysis of those records exclusively indicated 
that they do not differ from the population at large.   
Johnson (1998) found that humanities and business majors were more likely to 
leave the Navy prior to the O-4 board than were engineering majors.  Science and 
mathematics majors, however, were more likely to remain in the Navy.  Duffy (2000) 
found that engineering majors (when compared to pure science majors) were less likely 
to remain in the Surface Navy but more likely to laterally transfer into another 
community.  Accordingly, the current analysis should find that engineering majors are 
more likely to leave the Surface Navy than other undergraduate majors.  As Duffy 
hypothesized, the potential earning power of those with engineering degrees makes them 
more likely to leave.   
5. Dependent Status 
The dependent status variable is categorical.  Of the 3,206 officers in the data set, 
1602 (50.0%) are single, 932 (29.1%) are married with no children, and 672 (21.0%) are 
either married or divorced with one or more children.  Throughout this study, single 
officers are the reference group.  Previous SWO retention studies differentiated between 
divorced and married officers who had children.  This analysis combines the two 
situations in order to measure the effect of children, rather than marriage, on retention.  
Duffy (2000) and Mackin et al. (2002) both found that having dependents positively 
relates to retention in both the Navy and the Surface Navy specifically.  The present study 
should also find that officers who have children are more likely to remain in the Navy 
since this group has stronger ties to both the financial and medical/dental benefits of 
service in the military.    
6. Prior-Enlisted Status 
The prior-enlisted status variable is dichotomous, where non-prior=0 and prior=1.  
Of the 3,206 officers in the data set, 704 (22.0%) served as enlisted Sailors, Marines, 
Airmen, or Soldiers.  Throughout this analysis, officers without prior-enlisted service 
comprise the reference group.  Mackin et al. (2002) found a strong, positive relationship 
between prior-enlisted service and retention.  Since officers with prior service are both 
older and closer to retirement, they should always be much more likely to remain in the 
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Navy.  Accordingly, the current analysis predicts a strong, positive correlation between 
prior-enlisted service and retention in the Navy.      
7. Year Group 
The year group variable is categorical.  Of the 3,206 officers in the present study, 
645 (20.1%) are in YG93, 646 (20.1%) are in YG94, 712 (22.2%) are in YG95, 646 
(20.1%) are in YG96, and 557 (17.4%) are in YG97.  Generally, YG93 was the last YG 
to make its stay/leave decision prior to the SWOCP initiative.  Therefore, if the modeling 
conducted in Mackin & Darling (1996) and Mackin et al. (2002) is correct, retention 
should increase as SWOCP becomes a more permanent reality to SWOs.  Accordingly, 
YG93 is the reference group for the present analysis, and all other YGs are expected to 
positively relate to retention.  Additionally, many officers in YGs 96 and 97 reached their 
decision points after the 9/11 attacks that sparked an increase in patriotism and 
commitment to service throughout much of the country.  Any increases in retention must 
therefore be seen not only as being related to the institution of SWOCP but also within 
the context of 9/11 and changing economic conditions. 
8. Initial Homeport 
The initial homeport variable is categorical.  Table 2 summarizes the initial 
homeport distribution of the 3,206 officers in the present analysis: 
Table 2.  Initial Homeport Descriptive Statistics     
Homeport Frequency Percent 
MIDLANT (Norfolk) 1066 33.3 
PACNW (Everett, Bremerton) 254 7.9 
SOCAL (San Diego) 846 26.4 
SOUTH (Mayport, Pascagoula, Ingleside) 554 17.3 
HAWAII (Pearl Harbor) 209 6.5 
OVERSEAS (Yokosuka, Sasebo) 277 8.6 
While Table 2 denotes the significant homeports associated with each geographic 
category, Appendix A contains a complete listing of all homeports in the data set and 
their corresponding geographic category.  Since MIDLANT is the largest category, it will 
be the reference category for this study.  
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 No previous SWO retention study has statistically analyzed the effect of a junior 
officer’s initial homeport on his or her retention decision.  As established in the literature 
review of the present study, job satisfaction is clearly a significant determinant of one’s 
likelihood of remaining within an organization.  While job satisfaction most clearly 
relates to the impact the actual job has on one’s happiness, the work-life balance is also 
crucial.  One’s quality of life “on the beach” cannot be ignored when considering that 
officer’s satisfaction level with his or her current circumstances.  For instance, if an 
officer loves living in San Diego and realizes that service in the Navy is the enabler of 
said living arrangement, then it is reasonable to conclude that this same officer might see 
the Navy as a more attractive downstream career option.  If, on the other hand, the officer 
perceives that the Navy is the reason he or she is “stuck” in an undesirable location, then 
that officer is probably more likely to seek employment elsewhere.  Although higher 
retention levels in certain homeports do not precisely equate to higher job satisfaction in 
those ports, it could point to something that makes life generally more satisfying for those 
living in certain areas.   
A myriad of factors could contribute to an officer garnering satisfaction from 
where he or she lives—cost of living, quality of schools, recreational opportunities, 
proximity to friends and family, housing market, and population density are just a few of 
many factors that make certain places more attractive for certain people.  Additionally, 
the author has observed anecdotal evidence that a perception exists in the Surface Navy 
that commands on the West Coast are more “laid back” than those on the East Coast.  
Whether or not this perception is fact is certainly open to interpretation.  If retention 
levels differ greatly between certain homeports, then one can again reasonably conclude 
that there might be something about the commands in that geographic area that make 
them more likely to produce career-minded junior officers.  Since West Coast homeports 
are generally more popular with midshipmen (as observed anecdotally by the author), 
those junior officers who initially serve in West Coast homeports (Southern California, 
Hawaii, Pacific Northwest) should be more likely to remain in the Navy.  
9. CRUDES Experience 
Unlike the initial homeport variable, previous SWO retention studies have 
examined the effect a junior officer’s ship-type has on his or her retention behavior.  
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Figure 1 summarizes the findings of those studies discussed in this study’s literature 
review: 
Figure 1.  Initial Ship Assignment Analysis Summary from Literature Review 
Study Finding 
Bautista (1996) No significant relationships in logit analysis; Officers 
initially assigned to aircraft carriers less likely to retain 
Johnson (1998) CRUDES experience strong predictor of retention and 
promotion to LCDR 
Duffy (2000)  Service in cruiser or destroyer positively relates to 
retention 
Mackin et al. (2002) No significant relationships in analysis (Did not include 
USNA and ROTC graduates in ship assignment analysis) 
In addition to the above findings, both Bautista (1996) and Johnson (1998) found that 
CRUDES experience is conducive to timely SWO qualification amongst junior officers.  
Johnson also found a positive correlation between college GPAs and initial assignment to 
a cruiser or destroyer.  These findings likely indicate that potentially more capable and 
motivated junior officers choose to initially serve in CRUDES ships.   
During preliminary analysis, this author utilized the following ship type 
groupings: 
Table 3. Initial Ship Type Groupings, Frequencies, and Percent Within Sample 
Grouping Ship classes Frequency Percent
Carriers CV, CVN 184 5.7 
Cruisers CG, CGN 585 18.2 
Destroyers DD, DDG 935 29.2 
Frigates FFG 553 17.2 
Small Amphibs LPD, LSD, LST 403 12.6 
Big Amphibs LCC, LHA, LHD, LPH, MCS 238 7.4 
PCMinesweep ACU, MCM, MHS, MSC, PC 101 3.2 
CLFleet AD, AE, AGF, AO, AOE, AOR, ARS, AS 207 6.5 
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Since the destroyer grouping accounted for the largest percentage of initial assignments, 
the preliminary analysis used it as the reference group.  After continued analysis, 
however, it became evident that the CRUDES experience variable improved the retention 
model’s predictive power to a greater extent than did the initial ship type variable.  The 
CRUDES variable in use is categorical and describes a junior officer’s initial career 
progression with regards to service in a CG, CGN, DD, DDG, or FFG.  Of the 3,206 
officers in the study, 1599 (49.9%) served only in CRUDES platforms, 474 (14.8%) 
served in a CRUDES platform and then a non-CRUDES platform, 290 (9.0%) served in a 
non-CRUDES platform followed by a CRUDES platform, and 843 (26.3%) never served 
in a CRUDES platform.  The “Only CRUDES” variable is the reference category 
throughout this analysis.   
 Similar to previous studies, cross-tabulation analysis illustrated a relationship 
between both commissioning source and CRUDES experience and timely SWO 
qualification and CRUDES experience.  Naval Academy graduates were more likely to 
have served only in CRUDES platforms and were less likely to have never served in 
CRUDES platforms.  This observation supports anecdotal evidence that CRUDES 
platforms are more “popular” with officer candidates since during the years in which this 
study’s officers earned their commissions only USNA graduates selected their initial 
ships.  All others received assignments from BUPERS based on the “needs of the Navy.”  
Preliminary data analysis also illustrated the relationship found in Bautista (1996) and 
Johnson (1998) that CRUDES experience is conducive to a timely SWO qualification.  In 
the current study, those officers who never served in a CRUDES platform were less 
likely to earn SWO qualification within 30 months of commissioning.1  Clearly, 
CRUDES experience exerts a strong influence on a junior SWO’s career progression.  
Therefore, those officers without any CRUDES experience should be significantly less 
likely to remain in the Navy.     
                                                 
1 Cross-tabulation analysis indicated that 61.0% of officers with only CRUDES experience earned 
SWO designation within 30 months of reporting to their first ship.  Only 53.1% of those officers without 
any CRUDES experience met this qualification milestone.  The MoveOut and MoveIn groups qualified 
within 30 months at respective rates of 69.0% and 69.1%.  The significantly higher qualification rate in 
these groups could be slightly inflated, however, since all officers who moved between commands would 
have qualified during their first tour.  The Only CRUDES and Never CRUDES groups likely include 
officers who failed to attain qualification since they would only have served in one ship (junior officers do 
not transfer to their second ship without SWO qualification). 
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10. Initial Department 
Of the SWO retention studies in the present study’s literature review, only Duffy 
(2000) included an officer’s initial department assignment as part of the analysis.  His 
study, however, did not find any significant relationships between initial department 
assignment and retention.  This study will still include initial department as a categorical 
variable in order to verify Duffy’s results or, if appropriate, to attempt to explain why one 
department appears to be conducive to retention over another.  BUPERS assigns officers 
to shipboard billets based on each ship’s Officer Distribution and Control Report 
(ODCR).  Ideally, each officer holds a distinct Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) 
code.  The Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications (NAVPERS 
15839I, Volume I, Part C) catalogs the four-digit NOBC code and describes the duties 
associated with each officer billet—both ashore and afloat.   
Since junior officers often hold multiple jobs during their initial seagoing 
assignments, many records contained multiple NOBCs for one tour.  Each NOBC record 
in the data file also contained a corresponding month variable that denoted the duration of 
time the officer served in the associated NOBC.  The author therefore created a new 
variable (NOBC-primary) that enabled recognition of the billet that the officer occupied 
for the greater number of months during his or her first tour.  In order to determine the 
initial department assignment for the officer cohorts in the present study, the author first 
categorized NOBC codes into twelve groups as indicated in Table 4: 
32 
Table 4.  Navy Officer Billet Classification Code Frequencies and Groupings     
NOBC Group NOBC Dept. Frequency Percent 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Weapons 277 8.6 
Gunnery/Ordnance Weapons 263 8.2 
Fire Control Weapons 230 7.2 
Weapons Department Totals 770 24.0 
Combat Information Center Operations Operations 315 9.8 
Deck Operations Operations 372 11.6 
Navigation Operations 57 1.8 
Communications Operations 416 13.0 
Operations Department Totals 1160 36.2 
Auxiliaries Engineering 315 9.8 
Main Propulsion Engineering 248 7.7 
Damage Control Engineering 416 13.0 
Electrical Engineering 172 5.4 
Nuclear Power Engineering 125 3.9 
Engineering Department Totals 1276 39.8 
Of the 3,206 officers in the data file, 770 (24.0%) initially served in the Weapons (or 
Combat Systems) Department, 1160 (36.2%) initially served in the Operations 
Department, and 1276 (39.8%) initially served in the Engineering Department.  Appendix 
B contains a complete listing of NOBC codes and their respective groupings and 
departments.  Since it has the largest representation in the cohort and inport working 
hours are typically longer for Engineering Department officers, the Engineering 
Department will serve as the reference department throughout this analysis.  Any 
relationship between initial department assignment and retention will most likely be a 
weak one, but if one does exist engineers will probably be most likely to leave the Navy 
due to longer initial working hours. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a standard logistic regression methodology that the author 
utilized to analyze the relationship between retention in the Surface Navy and a series of 
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control and independent variables.  Figure 2 summarizes the expect influence of each 
variable in the proposed retention model:  
Figure 2.  Summary of Expected Influence of Variables in Retention Model 
Variable Reference Influence Strength
Gender Male Negative Strong 
Ethnic Background White Positive Weak 
Commissioning Source USNA Positive (OCS only) Strong 
Undergraduate Major Engineering Positive Strong 
Dependent Status Single/No Kids Positive (MarDivKids only) Strong 
Prior-Enlisted Status Non-Prior Positive Strong 
Year Group YG93 Positive Strong 
Initial Homeport MIDLANT Positive Weak 
CRUDES Experience Only CRUDES Negative Strong 
Initial Department Engineering Positive Weak 
Although the preceding analysis generally focused on the effect of the above variables on 
the STAYSWO decision, the following chapter will also examine an officer’s decision to 
laterally transfer from the Surface Navy by utilizing a second regression.  Figure 3 
describes each dependent variable: 
Figure 3.  Description of Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variable Description 
STAYSWO Officer is SWO-designated at YCS8 
LATOUT Officer is on active-duty but not SWO-designated at YCS8
After this study describes the results of each regression, it will conclude with 
recommendations for future Navy assignment policies based on the findings of the 


























IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Previous chapters reviewed the extensive body of literature pertaining to 
employee turnover, job satisfaction, human capital theory, and retention in the Surface 
Navy.  They also described the current study’s variables and predicted the strength and 
direction of each variable’s influence in the present model.  This chapter will utilize the 
marginal effects calculation described in the preceding chapter to discuss the results of 
regression analysis conducted to ascertain the determinants of the STAYSWO and 
LATOUT dependent variables.  Since the focus of this study is retention within the 
Surface Navy, the study will now continue with a thorough analysis of the STAYSWO 
regression.  A brief discussion of the LATOUT regression will then follow to conclude 
this chapter. 
A. STAYSWO REGRESSION RESULTS 
Before turning to the specific results of the STAYSWO regression, it is important 
to accurately describe the dependent variable.  As mentioned in the preceding chapter, 
STAYSWO is a dichotomous variable where 0=not SWO designated and 1=SWO 
designated at YCS8.  Those who are not SWO-designated fall into one of two categories: 
no longer in the Navy or in the Navy with a designator other than the SWO 111X series.  
It should be noted that SWO designation and SWO qualification are distinct 
circumstances.  Warrant officers, limited duty officers, and officers who laterally 
transferred from the SWO community often have obtained SWO qualification and rate 
wearing the SWO breast insignia.  These officers, however, are not SWO designated and 
are not eligible for SWOCP.  Of the 3,206 officers in the data file, 966 (30.1%) are SWO 
designated at YCS8.  The STAYSWO regression model correctly predicts 54.5% of the 
cases utilizing a cut value of .30.  In other words, of the cases with a probability of 
staying SWO exceeding 30%, the model correctly predicts retention in the Surface Navy 
54.5% of the time.  Table 5 provides the results of the STAYSWO regression: 
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Table 5.  STAYSWO Regression Results 
  B Marg Fx S.E. Sig. 
Female -0.562 -0.138 0.154 0.000 
Ethnicity1       0.663 
AfrAmer 0.024 0.006 0.141 0.868 
Hispanic 0.189 0.046 0.150 0.208 
Other 0.030 0.007 0.167 0.859 
MarDep @ MSR2       0.000 
MarNoKids 0.044 0.011 0.098 0.657 
MarDivKids 0.571 0.140 0.109 0.000 
Prior Enlisted 0.459 0.113 0.108 0.000 
Comm. Program3       0.000 
ROTC 0.061 0.015 0.098 0.531 
OCS-Other 0.839 0.206 0.123 0.000 
Undergrad Major4       0.001 
PhySci&Math 0.171 0.042 0.131 0.192 
BioSci 0.712 0.175 0.195 0.000 
SocSci 0.263 0.065 0.120 0.029 
Bus-Econ -0.068 -0.017 0.160 0.673 
Humanities 0.529 0.130 0.174 0.002 
Unknown 0.247 0.061 0.135 0.066 
Year Group5         
YG94 -0.009 -0.002 0.136 0.944 
YG95 0.114 0.028 0.131 0.385 
YG96 0.226 0.055 0.133 0.089 
YG97 0.178 0.044 0.139 0.201 
Initial Homeport6       0.027 
PACNW -0.450 -0.110 0.169 0.008 
SOCAL -0.109 -0.027 0.107 0.309 
SOUTH -0.339 -0.083 0.124 0.006 
HAWAII -0.047 -0.012 0.173 0.787 
OVERSEAS -0.208 -0.051 0.159 0.192 
Crudes Experience7       0.000 
MoveOut 0.133 0.033 0.118 0.261 
MoveIn 0.380 0.093 0.143 0.008 
Never -0.507 -0.125 0.108 0.000 
Initial Department8       0.558 
Weapons 0.083 0.020 0.108 0.441 
Operations 0.096 0.024 0.095 0.309 
Constant -1.415 -0.347 0.160 0.000 
** STAYSWO correct: 54.5% (Cut Value=.30) 
** Reference Variables: (1)White (2)Single (3)USNA (4)Engineering (5)YG93 
(6)MIDLANT (7)Only Crudes (8)Engineering 
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1. Influence of Control Variables  
With the exception of the ethnic background and year group variables, the 
demographic and background control variables influence the STAYSWO dependent 
variable as predicted.  Women are 13.8% less likely to remain in the Surface Navy than 
men.  The likely cause of this significant difference is that many women view a career in 
the Surface Navy and motherhood as inherently incompatible.  Another possible cause of 
this disparity is that women find being a SWO less meaningful than men do and therefore 
experience lower levels of job satisfaction (Miller & Wheeler, 1992). Officers with 
children are 14.0% more likely to stay SWO than those officers without children. As 
expected, having children, not being married, influences officers to remain in the Surface 
Navy.  Those officers with children likely value the financial stability that a career in the 
Navy provides by ensuring a healthy paycheck each month and extensive medical and 
dental coverage.  Prior-enlisted officers are also 11.3% more likely to stay in the Surface 
Navy than their peers.  Since these officers have considerably more time already invested 
in their careers, this finding supports previously cited research (Bautista, 1996; Johnson, 
1998; Duffy, 2000; Mackin et al., 2002). 
As predicted, OCS officers are much more likely to stay SWO than their Naval 
Academy counterparts.  The STAYSWO behavior of ROTC officers does not, however, 
significantly differ from the decisions made by USNA officers.  Engineering majors are 
also more likely to leave the Surface Navy than most other major groups.  Although not 
statistically significant, only the business and economics major category possess a 
negative coefficient when compared to the reference engineering major category.  The 
biological sciences, social sciences, humanities, and unknown major groups, however, 
both significantly and positively influence an officer’s decision to remain in the Surface 
Navy.  This influence was most significant for the biological sciences and humanities 
majors groups, which are 17.5% and 13.0%, respectively, more likely to stay SWO than 
engineering majors.  As previously mentioned, these groups likely perceive a reduced 
earning power in the civilian sector so they are more likely to continue as SWOs than the 
engineering majors who perceive the civilian sector offering very lucrative career 
opportunities.   
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Of the control variables in the model, only the ethnic background and year group 
variables fail to significantly influence an officer’s STAYSWO decision.  Unlike 
previous SWO retention studies cited in this literature review, no ethnic group is any 
more likely to remain in the Surface Navy than are white officers.  This change is more 
likely a reflection of increased opportunity for minorities in the civilian sector that 
mitigates the draw of the already level playing field that hopefully exists within the 
Surface Navy.  Finally, the year group variable does not exert the strong influence on the 
regression that the previous chapter predicted it would.  Only YG96 officers were more 
likely to remain in the Surface Navy at a statistically significant level than YG93 officers.  
The marginal effect (5.50%) is small, however, when compared to the marginal effect of 
other control variables.  It should also be noted though that YG95 and YG97 officers 
possess a positive coefficient although the strength of the relationship to staying SWO is 
not statistically significant.  Based on the low coefficient and the complete lack of 
statistical significance, this regression indicates that YG94 officers behaved in a nearly 
identical fashion as YG93 officers behaved with respect to the STAYSWO decision.  The 
regressions results as they relate to year group can thus be seen to indicate that SWOCP 
does not have as strong an effect on retention as analysts hoped it would.  If the retention 
bonus does strongly influence officers to stay in the Surface Navy, this regression 
analysis would have indicated significant and positive relationships between YG94-97 
and retention when compared to YG93.  It should be noted, however, that many YG94-96 
officers completed their minimum service commitments prior to the inception of SWOCP 
so the current analysis does not completely account for its effects. 
2. Influence of Major Independent Variables 
 Unlike the relatively accurate predictions made with respect to the influence of 
the control variables, the “job satisfaction” variables influence the STAYSWO decision 
in a largely different manner than predicted.  Of the three specified variables, only the 
CRUDES experience variable acts according to the predictions made in Figure 2 of the 
previous chapter.  Since previous SWO retention studies uniformly cited CRUDES 
experience as a strong predictor of an officer remaining in the Surface Navy, this study 
expected the same relationship to occur.  The regression clearly supported the findings of 
previous research.  When compared to those who had served only in CRUDES platforms 
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as division officers, those officers who never served in a CRUDES platform are 12.5% 
more likely to leave the Surface Navy.  Since the majority of ships in the Surface Navy 
are CRUDES platforms, an officer who never served in a cruiser, destroyer, or frigate 
would be significantly behind his or her peers with respect to the professional 
experiences associated with CRUDES operations—namely operating within a Carrier 
Strike Group.  It is not surprising then that those without any CRUDES experience are 
significantly less likely to remain in the Surface Navy.2   
The STAYSWO regression analysis does, however, reveal one finding that is 
surprising.  Those officers who transferred from a non-CRUDES platform to a CRUDES 
platform during their division officer tours were 9.3% more likely to stay in the Surface 
Navy than those who had served only in CRUDES platforms.  Initially, career 
opportunity seems to effectively explain this finding.  The SWO community managers 
often outline the importance of a diverse professional background in ensuring an officer 
has the repertoire of skills necessary to successfully advance within the community.  The 
officers who had “moved in” to CRUDES would thus have both the amphibious 
operational experience and the CRUDES experience desired of its officers by the SWO 
community.  If this explanation was the complete one, however, the MoveOut variable 
should also positively relate to an officer’s likelihood of staying SWO.  While the 
MoveOut variable does have a positive coefficient, the relationship is not a statistically 
significant one.  A more complete explanation could thus be that many officers who 
moved from a non-CRUDES platform to a CRUDES platform experienced higher levels 
of job satisfaction in the CRUDES ship and thus were motivated to remain in the Surface 
Navy since their most recent sea duty experience was a satisfying one.  Although this 
explanation is purely hypothetical, it is consistent with the results of the regression 
analysis and is worthy of consideration by the SWO community.   
 The initial homeport variable behaved in nearly the exact opposite manner as this 
author predicted.  Since West Coast homeports are traditionally more popular when 
midshipmen choose their initial ships, the expectation was that service in these homeports 
                                                 
2 Officers without any CRUDES experience are statistically more likely to possess the following 
characteristics: female, not prior enlisted, African American or Hispanic, ROTC or OCS graduate, and a 
business/economics major. 
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would positively relate to junior officers staying SWO.  This prediction hinged on the 
argument that those who received the assignments they desired were more likely to 
experience high levels of job satisfaction, which would in turn lead to greater 
organizational commitment.  The STAYSWO regression results, however, do not support 
this argument.  In fact, all homeport categories were negatively related to the MIDLANT 
reference category.3  Only two categories, PACNW and SOUTH, were significantly 
related, however, to the STAYSWO variable.  Officers who initially served in PACNW 
(Bremerton, Everett) ships were 11.0% more likely to leave the Surface Navy, and those 
who initially served in SOUTH (Mayport, Pascagoula, Ingleside) ships were 8.3% more 
likely to not stay SWO.  One possible explanation for the higher percentage of PACNW 
officers leaving the Surface Navy is that there is disproportionate representation of 
carriers and CLF ships in Bremerton and Everett.  Lower retention as a function of these 
platforms is consistent with Bautista (1996) since he found that officers initially serving 
in aircraft carriers were less likely to remain in the Surface Navy.   
Explaining the relationship between STAYSWO and SOUTH is more difficult.  
Of the homeports that comprise the SOUTH grouping, Mayport accounts for 64.3% of 
the cases, Ingleside accounts for 16.1%, and Pascagoula accounts for 15.2% of the cases.  
With the exception of two aircraft carriers in Mayport, Mayport and Pascagoula are 
exclusively CRUDES homeports.  Ingleside, however, accounts for nearly 85% of the 
cases where an officer initially served in a patrol craft or minesweeper.  In almost all 
instances where an officer’s initial ship is a patrol craft or minesweeper, he or she would 
next serve in a CRUDES ship, placing him or her into the MoveIn group for the 
CRUDES experience variable.  As previously discussed the MoveIn group demonstrated 
a significant and positive effect on STAYSWO.  Based on the above arguments, it would 
be difficult for an officer who began his or her career in the SOUTH group to not gain 
CRUDES experience.  The data set supports this logic as only 14.3% of the officers in the 
SOUTH grouping never served in a CRUDES ship while 26.3% of the entire data set 
never served in a CRUDES platform.  This discrepancy points to the likelihood that  
 
                                                 
3 Officers who initially served in MIDLANT ships are statistically more likely to possess the following 
characteristics: female, African American, married without children, OCS graduate, and a biological 
sciences major.  
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something about the SOUTH homeports specifically (as opposed to the prevalent ship 
types in these homeports) makes officers who serve in them less likely to remain in the 
Surface Navy.        
Perhaps the most interesting finding in the initial homeport variable analysis is 
that those who initially serve in MIDLANT ships are significantly more likely to 
continue their careers in the Surface Navy than those officers who began their careers 
elsewhere.  Clearly the prediction that homeport popularity with officer candidates will 
make “popular” homeports more likely to produce career-minded junior officers is 
incorrect.  Norfolk and Little Creek comprise 95.4% of the cases where officers fall in the 
MIDLANT grouping.  The present research thus indicates that officers whose initial 
assignments are in the Hampton Roads, Virginia area are more likely to remain in the 
Surface Navy.  One possible explanation is that junior officers who are more career-
minded choose to live in this area because of the lower cost of living and wide variety of 
ship types resident in these ports.  With the exception of minesweepers, every type of 
surface ship in the Navy’s inventory can be found in Norfolk or Little Creek.  The 
“variety” argument, however, also holds for San Diego.  The lower cost of living in 
Norfolk and Little Creek might influence young officers seeking to establish a firm 
financial foundation early in their careers as opposed to those who might be swayed by 
the “fun in the sun” of California or Hawaii.  The former group probably desires a stable 
career from the outset, thus making them more likely to remain a SWO.  Another 
possible explanation is that since the West Coast homeports are typically more popular, 
higher ranking midshipmen are more likely to receive these prized orders.  These junior 
officers might perceive that they have higher potential earning power in the civilian 
sector because of their scholastic success in college.  Such a perception would make this 
group more likely to leave the Surface Navy.   
The final independent variable, an officer’s initial shipboard department, did not 
significantly relate to the STAYSWO decision.  This finding is consistent with the 
findings of Duffy (2000).  The lack of a relationship between an officer’s initial 
department and his or her STAYSWO decision is not surprising.  Many officers migrate 
between departments as junior officers so the NOBC information in the data set might not 
be entirely accurate.  Furthermore, while there is variance between what officers in 
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different departments do on a daily basis, the day of a junior officer in one shipboard 
department is more similar than it is different than the day of a junior officer in another 
department. 
B. LATOUT REGRESSION RESULTS 
As one would reasonably expect, there are both significant differences and 
similarities between the STAYSWO regression and the LATOUT regression.  After 
excluding the 966 officers who remained in the Surface Navy past their decision points, 
2240 cases remained in the data set.  Of these officers, 672 (30%) laterally transferred 
from the Surface Navy.  Nearly all communities accept lateral transfers from the Surface 
Warfare community.  Once junior officers earn their SWO designation they can apply to 
BUPERS to transfer to the Restricted Line or Staff Corps communities in the Navy.  
Some also apply to transfer to other Unrestricted Line communities.  Since many 
communities rely on lateral transfers to augment their manning, the Surface Navy must 
always maintain some cognizance over the types of officers who are likely to transfer.  
For this reason, the present study includes the LATOUT regression.  The LATOUT 
regression model correctly predicts 63.5% of the cases utilizing a cut value of .30.  In 
other words, of the cases with a probability of lateral transfer exceeding 30%, the model 
correctly predicts a lateral transfer to another community 63.5% of the time.  It should be 
noted that the LATOUT variable only captures those who laterally transferred—it does 
not consider retention to YCS8.  Table 6 provides the LATOUT regression results: 
43 
Table 6.  LATOUT Regression Results 
  B Marg Fx S.E. Sig. 
Female 0.426 0.105 0.150 0.004 
Ethnicity1       0.711 
AfrAmer 0.095 0.024 0.176 0.589 
Hispanic 0.147 0.036 0.190 0.440 
Other -0.128 -0.032 0.200 0.523 
MarDep @ MSR2       0.000 
MarNoKids 0.559 0.138 0.115 0.000 
MarDivKids 1.207 0.298 0.139 0.000 
Prior Enlisted 0.767 0.190 0.136 0.000 
Comm. Program3       0.024 
ROTC -0.314 -0.078 0.115 0.006 
OCS-Other -0.145 -0.036 0.161 0.370 
Undergrad Major4       0.018 
PhySci&Math 0.350 0.087 0.149 0.019 
BioSci -0.162 -0.040 0.271 0.550 
SocSci 0.089 0.022 0.144 0.536 
Bus-Econ -0.246 -0.061 0.192 0.199 
Humanities -0.408 -0.101 0.234 0.082 
Unknown 0.033 0.008 0.172 0.847 
Year Group5       0.000 
YG94 0.765 0.189 0.172 0.000 
YG95 0.968 0.239 0.170 0.000 
YG96 1.312 0.325 0.170 0.000 
YG97 1.255 0.310 0.178 0.000 
Initial Homeport6       0.056 
PACNW -0.220 -0.054 0.205 0.283 
SOCAL 0.067 0.017 0.133 0.615 
SOUTH 0.179 0.044 0.150 0.230 
HAWAII 0.563 0.139 0.209 0.007 
OVERSEAS 0.141 0.035 0.187 0.450 
Crudes Experience7       0.000 
MoveOut -0.505 -0.125 0.161 0.002 
MoveIn -0.262 -0.065 0.200 0.192 
Never 0.260 0.064 0.121 0.032 
Initial Department8       0.339 
Weapons 0.144 0.036 0.133 0.281 
Operations 0.158 0.039 0.115 0.170 
Constant -2.380 -0.588 0.208 0.000 
** LATOUT correct: 63.5% (Cut Value=.30) 
** Reference Variables: (1)White (2)Single (3)USNA (4)Engineering (5)YG93 
(6)MIDLANT (7)Only Crudes (8)Engineering 
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Not surprisingly, women are 10.5% more likely to laterally transfer than men.  As 
previously mentioned, many female officers view a career in the Surface Navy as either 
being incompatible with the aspiration to start a family or less fulfilling than their male 
counterparts.  Laterally transferring to another community thus provides an opportunity 
to continue a naval career without the constant demands of sea duty.  The same argument 
holds for officers with dependents.  Married officers without children are 13.8% more 
likely to laterally transfer and officers with children are 29.8% more likely to move to 
another community.  Prior enlisted officers, who have invested more time in their naval 
careers, also laterally transfer at a higher rate than their peers who gained commissions 
without prior service. 
Naval Academy graduates are also more likely to laterally transfer than their 
ROTC or OCS counterparts.  Although only the ROTC variable’s coefficient is 
statistically significant, both the ROTC and OCS coefficients are negative in comparison 
to the reference USNA category. The cause of this result is not readily apparent since the 
Navy obligates both USNA and ROTC graduates to serve either in the Navy’s 
Unrestricted Line communities or the Marine Corps.  One possible explanation is that 
Naval Academy graduates possess a higher taste for the military lifestyle than their 
ROTC counterparts.  The undergraduate major variable also significantly impacts the 
lateral transfer decision.  Although only two coefficients are statistically significant 
(physical sciences and humanities), three of the five majors groups negatively relate to 
laterally transferring when compared to the engineering group.  Since many of the 
Restricted Line and Staff Corps involve the every-day application of engineering skill-
sets (Engineering Duty Officer and Civil Engineering Corps for example), this finding 
also makes logical sense.  The final control variable, year group, also heavily influences 
the regression.  All year groups in the model are much more likely to laterally transfer 
than YG93.  Most significantly, YG96 and YG97 are 32.5% and 31.0% more likely to 
laterally transfer than YG93!  Perceptions of reduced economic opportunity in the 
civilian sector and increased patriotism following the 9/11 attacks likely account for the 




argument that SWOCP did not have the initial effect that researchers predicted it would.  
Instead, increases in SWO retention are more likely the result of changing economic 
conditions and the 9/11 attacks.     
Of the independent variables in the model, the CRUDES experience variable 
influences the LATOUT decision most strongly.  Officers with no CRUDES experience 
are 12.1% more likely to laterally transfer.  Officers who moved out of the CRUDES 
community, however, are 16.1% less likely to laterally transfer than those officers who 
had only served in CRUDES platforms.  Although statistically insignificant, the MoveIn 
category’s coefficient is also negative. Clearly, CRUDES experience correlates to 
retention in the Surface Navy while a lack of CRUDES experience influences an officer 
to either leave the Navy or laterally transfer to another community.  The initial homeport 
analysis is, once again, more complicated.  In the LATOUT model, HAWAII officers are 
13.9% more likely to laterally transfer than MIDLANT officers.  Although statistically 
insignificant, the SOCAL, SOUTH, and OVERSEAS categories also possess positive 
coefficients.  Although purely hypothetical, a possible explanation is that officers who 
begin their careers in these homeports are typically more competitive to successfully 
laterally transfer since they would have been higher performing in the first place to be 
able to obtain orders to more popular homeports.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
With the exception of the year group analysis, the control variables in the 
STAYSWO and LATOUT regressions influence these decisions as predicted.  The 
independent determinants, especially the initial homeport variable, produce much more 
surprising results.  Despite the assumed popularity of West Coast homeports, officers 
who begin their careers in Norfolk or Little Creek are much more likely to remain in the 
Surface Navy than their peers.  As predicted, CRUDES experience positively influences 
an officer’s decision to continue his or her career in the Surface Navy.  The initial 
department results verify Duffy (2000)’s conclusion that an officer’s initial department 
does not significantly influence his or her career decisions.  Since all division officer jobs 
share a multitude of characteristics, this finding is not surprising.  Based on the marginal 
effects calculations in the STAYSWO regression analysis, the officer most likely to 
continue his or her career in the Surface Navy possesses the following characteristics: 
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male, married or divorced with children, prior enlisted, OCS officer, biological sciences 
major, YG96, MIDLANT initial homeport, and moved into the CRUDES community.  
By comparison the officer least likely to remain a SWO possesses these characteristics: 
female, single without children, not prior enlisted, USNA or ROTC graduate, business or 
economics major, YG93 or YG94, PACNW initial homeport, and never served in the 
CRUDES community.  The concluding chapter of this study will now discuss the 
implications and limitations of this study and provide recommendations for further study.    
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V. CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis examined the influence of both demographic variables and 
“fleet experience” variables on a junior officer’s decision to remain in the Surface Navy 
or to laterally transfer to another community within the Navy.  The “fleet experience” 
variables, which include an officer’s initial homeport, initial shipboard department, and 
the presence and sequencing of CRUDES experience during the division officer tours, 
partially capture the potential influence of job satisfaction and quality of leadership on 
the stay/leave decision.  While these variables imperfectly approximate such complicated 
constructs, the study does effectively illustrate the need to consider factors other than 
demographics, personal background, and financial compensation when analyzing 
officers’ career decisions.  Put simply, retention in the Surface Navy is neither 
predetermined by an officer’s background nor determined solely by an officer’s 
satisfaction with his or her paycheck.  In other words, what happens in the Fleet matters! 
A. MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
Of the independent variables in the retention model, the CRUDES experience 
variable exerted the strongest influence on an officer’s decision to remain in the Surface 
Navy.  Those officers with some CRUDES experience are much more likely to continue 
their careers as SWOs than those officers who have never served in a CRUDES platform.  
A myriad of factors likely contribute to this behavioral pattern.  The Surface Warfare 
community often argues that there is “no such thing as a bad ship.”  While this author 
agrees with this sentiment, the present research does indicate that CRUDES experience 
relates to producing more career-minded officers.  The theoretical linchpins of this thesis, 
the importance of job satisfaction and leadership, would thus lead the analyst to conclude 
that CRUDES ships engage in more satisfying missions and benefit from better 
leadership.  While this author is admittedly biased based on the nature of his SWO 
experiences (exclusively CRUDES platforms), officers in CRUDES ships are more likely 
to have intimate experience with “tip of the spear” operations.  Whether as a boarding 
officer on a maritime interdiction mission, a strike officer conducting Tomahawk strike 
operations, or as a watch officer engaged in an air defense problem, SWOs in CRUDES 
ships experience a wide range of high-intensity operations.  This argument does not seek, 
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however, to downplay the importance of non-CRUDES platforms.  All ships in the Fleet 
certainly perform missions that are absolutely critical to the nation’s defense.  The 
present argument only implies that the CRUDES navy may attract officers (both junior 
officers and more senior shipboard leadership) who possess a propensity to pursue a 
career in the Navy. 
Another significant finding in the present study is the surprising result of the 
initial homeport analysis.  Despite the perceived popularity of West Coast homeports (as 
demonstrated by the high demand for these homeports seen in officer candidates), those 
officers who initially served in Norfolk or Little Creek ships are more likely to pursue a 
SWO career.  To return to the theoretical foundation of this thesis, this finding could also 
indicate that more effective leadership is resident at the nation’s largest naval base.  
Another, more tangible, explanation of the MIDLANT effect is that the large number of 
ships based in the Hampton Roads area allows for greater geographic stability, thus 
creating a higher quality of life for the officer and improving the likelihood of his 
choosing to remain in the Surface Navy.  A final explanation for the impressive retention 
record of the MIDLANT homeports spins the popularity argument in a different 
direction.  Since an officer’s undergraduate record helps to determine his or her initial 
orders, those officers with more impressive records are more likely to gain assignments to 
the more popular West Coast homeports.  Conversely, those whose grades and 
performance were not as impressive initially receive orders to ships in Norfolk.  Since 
these officers may not perceive as much opportunity in the civilian sector, they may be  
more likely to remain in the Navy. 
Finally, the present analysis discovered that SWOCP does not influence the 
retention decision nearly to the extent that the Surface Navy’s leadership had hoped it 
would.  Although SWO retention did increase over the analyzed year groups, only 
YG96’s retention improvement was at a statistically significant level.  Coupling this 
result with the overwhelmingly significant influence of year group on the LATOUT 
regression leads the prudent researcher to conclude that prevalent economic opportunities 
and 9/11 effects increased retention, not the creation of SWOCP.  
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B. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The lack of performance data—both at the undergraduate level and once 
commissioned—most significantly inhibits the strength of the present analysis.  Adding a 
control variable to the retention model that accounts for undergraduate performance 
would strength the explanatory power of the model.  Much of the initial homeport 
analysis hinges on the argument that higher performing officer candidates are more likely 
to choose West Coast homeports.  While this reasoning is logically sound, undergraduate 
performance data would illustrate quantifiable relationships that would make the 
argument more powerful.  Along similar lines, including officer performance data would 
also increase the predictive power of the retention model.  If this study’s literature review 
is correct, positive performance appraisal increases job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment.  It thus follows that including fitness report data would improve the model.  
Such an inclusion would also allow community managers to evaluate which officers are 
remaining in the Surface Navy.  Since this analysis has indicated that officers who 
perceived less opportunity in the civilian sector are more likely to stay in the Surface 
Navy, it would be incredibly valuable to examine the officer performance trends between 
those who stay and those who do not. 
As mentioned multiple times throughout this analysis, the job satisfaction 
construct is the theoretical foundation behind the inclusion of the “fleet experience” 
variables.  Again, while logically sound, this argument is, in some respects, a “leap of 
faith.”  The data do prove that certain types of ships and certain homeports improve the 
likelihood of SWO retention, but there really is not definitive proof that the cause is job 
satisfaction or differing qualities within the leadership.  Only qualitative research can 
verify this theory.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
To continue to improve the Navy’s understanding of its Surface Warfare Officers’ 
retention behavior, the author recommends the continuation of the present research as 
follows: 
• Merge performance data into the retention model.  As previously discussed, 
performance data would certainly improve the predictive power of this study’s 
retention model.  Unfortunately, the current fitness report system inhibits the 
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research since all Navy O-1s and O-2s can receive no higher than a “promote” 
promotion recommendation.  If future researchers could reliably obtain it, advanced 
qualification data (Engineering Officer of the Watch, Tactical Action Officer) could 
serve as officer performance approximations. 
• Conduct extensive qualitative research that examines fleet experience variables.  
Survey and focus group data could help to identify varying job satisfaction levels in 
different ship types, departments, and homeports.  Researchers must take care, 
however, to utilize a wide sample of ships so that they can reliably conclude that 
trends are based on the fleet experience variables, not specific commands.   
• Include survey questions in SWOCP application.  The current SWOCP 
application does not provide the Navy feedback as to why that officer has chosen to 
remain in the Surface Navy.  Carefully crafted questions would allow researchers to 
better pinpoint why officers want to stay SWO.        
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APPENDIX A: INITIAL HOMEPORT FREQUENCIES 
Homeport Frequency Percent 
MIDLANT 1,066 33.3 
Norfolk, VA 912 28.4 
Little Creek, VA 105 3.3 
Earle, NJ 34 1.1 
Newport News, VA 13 0.4 
Newport, RI 1 0.0 
No Homeport 
Assigned 1 0.0 
PACNW 254 7.9 
Everett, WA 129 4.0 
Bremerton, WA 125 3.9 
SOCAL 846 26.4 
San Diego, CA 796 24.8 
Concord, CA 24 0.7 
Long Beach, CA 14 0.4 
Alameda, CA 8 0.2 
Coronado, CA 3 0.1 
Oakland, CA 1 0.0 
SOUTH 554 17.3 
Mayport, FL 356 11.1 
Ingleside, TX 89 2.8 
Pascagoula, MS 84 2.6 
Charleson, SC 22 0.7 
Corpus Christi, TX 2 0.1 
Orlando, FL 1 0.0 
HAWAII 209 6.5 
Pearl Harbor, HI 209 6.5 
OVERSEAS 277 8.6 
Yokosuka, Japan 195 6.1 
Sasebo, Japan 71 2.2 
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APPENDIX B: NOBC FREQUENCIES 
NOBC (NOBC Title) Frequency Percent
Anti-Submarine Warfare 277 8.6
9206 (ASW Weapons Officer) 264 8.2
9253 (ASW Division Officer) 12 0.4
8606 (Aviation Antisubmarine Classification and Analysis Officer) 1 0.0
Combat Information Center Operations 315 9.8
9217 (NTDS CIC Officer) 175 5.5
9216 (CIC Officer) 89 2.8
9282 (Ship's Electronic Warfare Officer) 22 0.7
9274 (Afloat Operations Officer) 20 0.6
9851(Naval Security Group Direct Support Officer--Surface) 4 0.1
9227 (General NTDS CIC Officer) 2 0.1
9640 (Operational Intelligence Officer) 2 0.1
9275 (NTDS Afloat Operations Officer) 1 0.0
Gunnery/Ordnance 263 8.2
9252 (Gunnery Division Officer) 236 7.4
9250 (General Weapons Division Officer) 15 0.5
9258 (General Weapons Officer) 9 0.3
9202 (Gunnery/Ordnance Officer) 3 0.1
Fire Control 230 7.2
9237 (General Fire Control Officer) 64 2.0
9246 (General Strike Warfare Officer) 63 2.0
9247 (Surface-to-Air Missile Strike Warfare Officer) 46 1.4
9283 (Ship's Electronic Material Officer) 38 1.2
9238 (Surface-to-Air Missile Fire Control Officer) 18 0.6
9254 (Guided Missiles Division Officer) 1 0.0
Deck Operations 372 11.6
9242 (First Lieutenant) 363 11.3
9278 (Ship's Boatswain) 7 0.2
9343 (UNREP Equipment Maintenance Officer) 2 0.1
Navigation 57 1.8
9284 (Ship's Navigator) 50 1.6
9255 (General Surface Ship Watch Officer) 3 0.1
2605 (Administrative Assistant) 2 0.1
2615 (Administrative Officer) 1 0.0
9286 (Ship's Secretary) 1 0.0
Auxiliaries 315 9.8
9302 (Auxiliary Machinery Officer) 315 9.8
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NOBC (NOBC Title) Frequency Percent
Main Propulsion 248 7.7
9337 (Gas Turbine Main Propulsion Assistant) 100 3.1
9341 (Steam Main Propulsion Assistant) 61 1.9
9305 (Boiler Officer) 35 1.1
9384 (Steam Main Engine Officer) 34 1.1
9336 (Diesel Main Propulsion Assistant) 14 0.4
9306 (1200psi Steam System Boiler Officer) 2 0.1
9335 (General Main Propulsion Assistant) 1 0.0
9364 (Gas Turbine Ship's Engineer Officer) 1 0.0
Damage Control 416 13.0
9308 (Damage Control Assistant) 360 11.2
9348 (Repair Division Officer) 56 1.7
Electrical 172 5.4
9353 (Ship's Electrical Officer) 172 5.4
Nuclear Power 125 3.9
9371 (Nuclear Ship's Engineer Officer) 47 1.5
9393 (Ship's Reactor Mechanical Assistant) 31 1.0
9394 (Ship's Reactor Control Assistant) 18 0.6
9374 (Nuclear Ship's Engineer Officer--Electrical) 18 0.6
9373 (Nuclear Ship's Engineer Officer--Damage Control) 6 0.2
9372 (Nuclear Ship's Engineer Officer--Main Propulsion 5 0.2
Communications 416 13.0
9582 (Information Systems Officer) 380 11.9
9745 (ADP Systems Maintenance Officer) 18 0.6
9585 (No Longer Listed) 7 0.2
9535 (CMS Material Custodian) 5 0.2
9705 (ADP Systems Director) 4 0.1
9595 (Communications Traffic Officer) 2 0.1
**Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications (NAVPERS 
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